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CONTRACT LAW - WAIVER OF ARBITRATION RIGHTS BY 
LITIGATING ONE ISSUE IS NOT A WAIVER OF THE SAME 
RIGHTS AS TO UNRELATED ISSUES. Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. 
Associated Jewish Charities, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1982). 
In 1976, Charles J. Frank., Inc. (the Contractor) contracted with 
Associated Jewish Charities of Baltimore, Inc. (the Owner) for the con-
struction of a Jewish community center. The contract provided for 
binding arbitration as the means of resolving all conflicts that arose 
from the agreement. 1 In the fall of the following year, a dispute arose 
concerning certain excavation work performed by a subcontractor.2 
Although the issue was arbitrable, the Contractor, the Owner, and the 
subcontractor litigated the dispute and ultimately settled the problem 
pursuant to a consent decree.3 Shortly thereafter, another dispute arose 
between the Owner and the Contractor, unrelated to the initial excava-
tion suit, over allegedly faulty workmanship. Consistent with his con-
tractual right, the Contractor demanded arbitration.4 The Owner 
1. Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 445, 450 
A.2d 1304, 1305 (1982). The arbitration clause provided, inter alia, that "[a]ll 
claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to, [the] 
Contract ... shall be decided by arbitration .... " This exact arbitration clause 
has been the subject of previous litigation before the court of appeals. See Fred-
erick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc., 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 
(1975). Arbitration has been broadly defined as: 
[A] contractual proceeding whereby, the parties to any controversy or 
dispute, in order to obtain an inexpensive and speedy final disposition of 
the matter involved, select judges of their own choice and by consent 
submit their controversy to such judges for determination, in the place of 
the tribunals provided by the ordinary processes of law. 
M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 
(1968) (citing Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 ,P.2d 49, 50 
(1939». Arbitration has the same basic goal as civil litigation - the just resolu-
tion of a dispute. See Comment, Waiver of the Right to Compel Arbitration-A 
Directional Ana'tsis, 16 CAL. W.L. REv. 375 (1980). Arbitration, however, unlike 
civil litigation, IS favored by many commentators because of its imputed speed 
and economy. M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION § 20.1 (1968); 5 AM. JUR. 2DArbitration and Award § 1 (1962 & Supp. 1982). 
In 1965, the General Assembly enacted the Maryland Uniform Arbitration 
Act. MD. CTS. & JUD. hoc. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1974). Subsumed 
within this enactment was the recognition of arbitration's primary purpose to 
"discourage litigation and to foster voluntary resolution of disputes in a forum 
created, controlled, and administered according to the parties' agreement to arbi-
trate." Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 
307,320,320 A.2d 558, 565 (1974) (citing Maretta v. Greenfield, 267 Md. 287, 291, 
297 A.2d 244, 246 (1972», rev'd on other grounds, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 
(1975). 
2. Frank, 294 Md. at 445, 450 A.2d at 1305. The problem was whether the subcon-
tractor's removal of earth from an adjacent field was additional work entitling 
him to additional compensation. The subcontractor sought $10,172.00 for his 
work. 
3. Id at 445-46, 450 A.2d at 1305. The consent decree was entered in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore County, the Honorable Walter R. Haile presiding. Consoli-
dated Excavators, Inc. v. Charles J. Frank, Inc., No. 112-113-98463 (Balto. Co. 
Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 1980). 
4. Frank, 294 Md. at 446, 450 A.2d at 1305. The American Arbitration Association 
S86 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 12 
responded by filing suit against the Contractor, the contractor's surety, 
and the project architect. The contract between the architect and the 
Owner did not contain an arbitration clause.s In addition, the Owner 
moved to stay the arbitration proceedings alleging that the Contractor 
waived his right to demand arbitration when he participated in the ini-
tial litigation. The Owner further asserted that if he were forced to 
arbitrate with the Contractor on the one hand, and litigate with the 
architect on the other, the Owner could be faced with inconsistent deci-
sions. The trial court agreed with the Owner and held that the Con-
tractor waived his right to demand arbitration for all purposes under 
the contract. Accordingly, the lower court granted the Owner's motion 
to stay the arbitration proceedings.6 The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land reversed7 and held, as a matter of first impression, that the waiver 
of the right to arbitrate one issue by pursuing litigation does not neces-
sarily constitute a general waiver of the right to arbitrate other unre-
lated issues arising from the same contract.8 The court further ruled 
that the Contractor has a right to demand arbitration even though the 
Owner may be forced to litigate the same or similar issues with the 
project architect.9 
The threshold question in Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jew-
ish Charities, Inc., 10 was whether the litigation of one arbitrable issue 
constitutes a waiver11 of the right to demand arbitration as to other 
served formal notice of the demand for arbitration on March 31, 1980. The dis-
pute concerned final payment under the contract in the amount of $139,579.11. 
Id. 
5. Id. In fact, provisions in the architect's contract providing for arbitration were 
intentionally deleted. Id. at 455,450 A.2d at 1310. 
6.1d. at 446-47, 450 A.2d 1305-06. The lower court held that it was not the potential 
for inconsistent results which required the waiver but rather its belief that once 
any waiver of an arbitration right was effectuated, it extended to all other matters 
arising from the contract. I d. 
7.1d. at 445, 450 A.2d at 1310. 
8.1d. 
9. Id. at 459-60, 450 A.2d at 1312. 
10. 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1982). 
II. The right to arbitration is strictly a contractual one. In C.W. Jackson & Assoc., 
Inc. v. Brooks, 289 Md. 658, 426 A.2d 378 (1981), Judge Smith stated the right as 
follows: "Arbitration is a matter of contract. In this case the parties contracted 
when they agreed to submit their dispute to the arbitrator for resolution. In the 
absence of contract there was no way for the matter to go to arbitration." Id. at 
666,426 A.2d at 382; see also United Steelworkers v. Warriors & Gulf Navigation 
Co., 363 U.S. 544, 582 (1960) (the right of arbitration is strictly contractual). 
However, as with other contractual rights, a waiver may be found. In Mary-
land, waiver is defined as '<the intentional relinquishment of a known right." St. 
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 291 Md. 139, 145, 433 A.2d 1135, 1138 
(I981);seea/so M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION § 19.01 (1968). The legal burden to show a waiver of a written contractual 
term is by preponderance of the evidence. See University Nat'l Bank v. Wolfe, 
279 Md. 512, 522, 369 A.2d 570,576 (1917); S. WILUSTON, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 623 (1979). 
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disputes that arise out of the same contract. 12 Some courts hold that 
the waiver of arbitration in the first instance extends to all other mat-
ters arising out of the original agreement. 13 However, an analysis of 
these decisions reveals that the initial waiver and the subsequent re-
quest for arbitration concern the same or a closely related issue. For 
example, in Midwest Window Systems, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc., 14 
the seller entered a consent judgment on a note given by the buyer. 
The buyer countered by filing an affirmative suit against the seller and 
moved to vacate the consent judgment. IS The seller, in accordance 
with this contractual right, demanded arbitration of the issues raised in 
the affirmative suit and the lower court granted the motion. 16 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and 
held that the seller waived his right to demand arbitration when he 
initially chose a judicial forum. The court noted that, in actuality, only 
one controversy existed between the parties and that an attempt to bi-
furcate the matter would only complicate the single issue. 17 
The Frank court distinguished Midwest Window and other "single 
issue" theory cases by implicitly finding that the initial litigation and 
the subsequent request for arbitration in Frank concerned issues that 
were sefarate and distinct. 18 Since Maryland lacked any cases of prec-
edentia value, the court of appeals turned to other jurisdictions for 
guidance to determine the extent of the waiver of arbitration when two 
issues are unrelated. 
Courts which have faced the issue of unrelated disputes similar to 
that raised in Frank hold that the initial waiver extends only to the 
12. There was no question that by litigating the initial dispute to a conclusion, a 
waiver as to that issue was effectuated. Frank, 294 Md. at 450, 450 A.2d at 1307. 
13. See, e.g., Midwest Window Systems, Inc. v. Amcor Indus. Inc., 630 F.2d 535 (7th 
Cir. 1980); Seville Condominium #1, Inc. v. Clearwater Dev. Corp., 340 So.2d 
1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cerro denied, 348 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1977). 
14. 630 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1980). 
15. Id at 536. 
16. Id 
17. Id at 537. Similarly, in Seville Condominium #1, Inc. v. Clearwater Dev. Corp., 
340 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cerro denied, 348 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1977), 
a management corporation filed suit against eight condominium resident associa-
tions seeking the collection of maintenance fees. The residents, in turn, brought a 
class action suit against the management. The lower court granted the manage-
ment's motion to compel arbitration and an interlocutory appeal followed. 340 
So. 2d at 1244. The appellate court held that by filing the initial suit, the manage-
ment had waived its right to demand arbitration and set aside the lower court's 
arbitration order. The court in so ruling found that the dispute for which man-
agement sought arbitration involved the same subject matter for which the man-
agement instituted the original court proceedings. Id 
18. Frank, 294 Md. at 453-54, 450 A.2d at 1308-09. The court rejected the Owners 
argument that the present dispute and the initial litigation were actually one large 
issue which arose out of one ''unsatisfactory business relationship" between the 
parties. Id at 455, 450 A.2d at 1310. See Brief for Appellee at 10, Charles J. 
Frank, Inc. V. Associated Jewish Charities, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 
(1982). 
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particular issue litigated and not to subsequent unrelated disputes. 19 
This view was articulated inArmco Steel Corp. v. Renago Construction, 
Inc. 20 In Armco, a con1lict arose in which the contractor, despite an 
arbitration clause, sued the owner for $665. The owner pleaded to the 
merits and demanded a jury trial. Thereafter, the owner demanded 
arbitration on an unrelated dispute, in the amount of $44,000, arising 
from the same contract. The issue on appeal was whether the owner's 
participation in the aforementioned court action caused a waiver of his 
right to subsequently demand arbitration. The New York court held 
that because the second dispute was separate and distinct from the is-
sue involved in the litigation, the owner had a right to compel arbitra-
tion.21 Similarly, in Standard Company of New Or/eons, Inc. v. Elliot 
Construction Co., 22 a subcontractor brought suit against the contractor 
and the owner for the unpaid balance of his contract.23 The contractor 
filed a third party claim against the owner. Two months later, the con-
tractor invoked arbitration against the owner under the same contract 
but on an unrelated matter.24 The owner filed a motion to block the 
arbitration, claiming the contractor had waived his right by the initial 
foray into a judicial forum. The Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected 
the owner's agreement, found the issues separate, and held that the 
contractor had not waived his right to demand arbitration.2s 
Through Frank, Maryland adopts the logic of Armco and Elliot 
Construction. In the case at issue, the court reasoned that participating 
in a judicial proceeding "in and of itself, is too equivocal to support an 
inference of an intentional relinquishment of the right to arbitrate is-
sues other than those raised and/or decided."26 As a buttress, the court 
cited Maryland's "legislative policy" favoring the enforcement of con-
tractual agreements to arbitrate.27 Thus, absent additional proof of in-
tent, a party who proceeds to settle an arbitrable matter in a judicial 
forum does not waive his right to arbitrate unrelated issues arising out 
of the same contract. 
Once the court in Frank found that the Contractor had not waived 
19. This rationale is best evidenced by the New York courts. See Clurman v. 
Clurman, 52 N.Y.2d 1036,420 N.E.2d 385, 438 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1981); DeSapio v. 
Kohlmeyer, 35 N.Y.2d 402,321 N.E.2d 770,362 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1974); Denihan v. 
Denihan, 34 N.Y.2d 307, 313 N.E.2d 759, 357 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1974); Armco Steel 
Corp. v. Renago Const., Inc., 34 A.D.2d 887, 312 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1970). 
20. 34 A.D.2d 887, 312 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1970). 
21. Id at 888, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 162. 
22. 363 So. 2d 671 (La. 1978). 
23. Id at 672. 
24. Id at 673. 
25. Id at 675-76. 
26. Frank, 294 Md. at 454,450 A.2d at 1309. 
27. Id at 455, 450 A.2d at 1310. In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 293 
Md. 409, 445 A.2d 14 (1982), the court of appeals articulated this legislative policy 
by stating that, "the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, enacted in 1965 ... 
embodies a legislative policy favoring enforcement of executory agreements to 
arbitrate." Id at 421, 445 A.2d at 19. 
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his right to arbitration, it was forced to decide the related issue of 
whether the Owner was otherwise entitled to a stay of arbitration. The 
Owner argued that if he were compelled to arbitrate with the Contrac-
tor on the one hand, and to litigate with the architect on the other, he 
would face the burden of duplicative proceedings and perhaps incon-
sistent results.28 Unfortunately, this issue is addressed in only a few 
reported decisions. Nevertheless, emerging from this limited amount 
of case law are two persuasive schools of thought. Some jurisdictions 
conclude that the prospect of multiple proceedings, carrying a potential 
for inconsistent findings, provides a basis for overriding one party's 
right to arbitration.29 In the Illinois case of J.E., Inc. v. Vicik,30 the 
owners of a house were faced with several pending suits by the general 
contractor and subcontractors. The general contractor, pursuant to his 
contract, moved for arbitration over the dispute with the owners and 
argued that he had a contractual right to arbitrate his claim even if it 
was factually similar to the issues which the subcontractors sought to 
litigate. The court rejected this argument and held: 
Where an arbitration agreement involves some, but not all, of 
the parties to a multi-party litigation, the policy favoring arbi-
tratIon must be weiglied against the .{>olicies favoring joinder 
of claims. Where arbitratIon would mcrease rather than de-
crease delay, comolexity, and costs, it should not receive fa-
vored treatment.3 t 
Accordingly, the general contractor's motion to arbitrate was denied. 
The underlying rationale of this and other similar opinions is that 
economy of time and expense, factors which generally sway the court 
in favor of arbitration, can also be a reason for denying arbitration 
when it would defeat rather than further these goals.32 
Other jurisdictions conclude that arbitration should not be stayed 
regardless of the possibility of inconsistent results.33 In Frank, Mary-
land adopts this approach. While the court cites three distinct reasons 
28. Frank, 294 Md. at 454, 450 A.2d at 1310. 
29. J.F., Inc. v. Vicik, 99 lli. App. 3d 815, 426 N.E.2d 257 (1981); County of Jefferson 
v. Barton-Douglas Contractors, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 155 (Iowa 1979). In England, a 
trial court has discretion to deny arbitration if some parties to the action are 
outside the arbitration agreement and some are within. See Tounton-Collins v. 
Cromie, I W.L.R. 633, 635-636 (C.A. 1964); Tumock v. Sartoris, 43 Ch. D. 150 
(Ch. 1889). 
30. 99 lli. App. 3d 815, 426 N.E.2d 257 (1981). 
31. Id at 820, 426 N.E.2d at 261. This rationale has also been adopted in Prestressed 
Concrete, Inc. v. Adolfson & Peterson, Inc., 308 Minn. 20, 24, 240 N.W.2d 551, 
553 (1976) (where arbitration would increase rather than decrease delay, complex-
ity, and costs, it should not receive favored treatment). 
32. See Ford Motor Co. v. MIS Maria Gorthon, 397 F. Supp. 1332, 1337 (D. Md. 
1975) (dictum). 
33. See Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 715-16 (7th Cir. 1967) 
(applying Illinois law); Town of Danners v. Wexler Constr. Co., 422 N.E.2d 782 
(Mass. App. 1981). 
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for its decision,34 the most persuasive, and perhaps the underlying ra-
tionale for all decisions that permit subsequent arbitration, was articu-
lated by the District of Columbia Circuit Court in Travel Consultants, 
Inc. v. Travel Management COrp:3S 
Consultants complain of the burden of pursuing two actions 
concurrently in two different forums, and asks for a ruling 
that either all or none of the actions be referred to arbitration. 
That burden falls on Consultants because it signed two differ-
ent agreements with the same party, one requiring arbitration, 
and the other containing no arbitration provision. Consultants 
shouldered that burden voluntarily, and we see no basis for judi-
cial interposition. 36 
As stated previously, in Frank the Owner signed a contract with 
the Contractor containin.p an arbitration clause and a contract with the 
architect which did not. 3 The court, in accordance with Travel Consul-
tants, determined that this voluntary action of the Owner was not a 
viable reason for removing the Contractor's right to arbitrate. Further-
more, the court stated that an order to "enjoin arbitration under these 
circumstances is inherently unfair to a party contractually entitled to 
arbitration. "38 
In Frank, the Maryland court of appeals furthered its preferential 
treatment towards arbitration by serving notice that the waiver of arbi-
tration rights will be severely limited. Moreover, few judicial policies, 
including the avoidance of multiple proceedings, will outweigh the im-
portance of the right to compel arbitration. The court's well reasoned 
opinion evidences an intent to foster the use and enforcement of the 
contractual right to arbitrate. 
Neal Mullan Brown 
34. The three rationales can be summed up as follows: (I) the public policy in favor 
of arbitration would be frustrated if agreements to arbitrate were not enforced; 
(2) the enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act evidences a legislative intent 
that arbitration not be enjoined to prevent a multiplicity of actions; and (3) it is 
unfair to deprive a party to an arbitration agreement of its right to arbitrate when 
the burden of duplicative proceedings and inconsistent results was created by the 
voluntary action of the party that would bear the burden. Frank, 294 Md. at 456, 
458, 450 A.2d at 1311. 
35. 367 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967). 
36. 367 F.2d at 339 (emphasis added). 
37. Frank, 294 Md. at 454,450 A.2d at 1310. 
38. Id at 459-60,450 A.2d at 1312. 
